



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



Jeffrey Kaye, Ph.D.
[REDACTED]

SEP 04 2014

Subject: OSD MDR Case 14-M-3329

Dear Dr. Kaye:

We have reviewed the enclosed documents in consultation with the Joint Staff (JS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and have declassified them in part. OSD excised information is properly classified under Executive Order 13526, section 1.4(c),(e), and (g) and is also protected under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 section (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424, (b)(5), and (b)(6). JS excised information is still properly classified under section 1.4(a) and (g) and is also protected under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 section (b)(5). CIA excised information is still properly classified under section 1.4(c). DIA excised information is exempt under section 3.3(b)(1), still properly classified under section 1.4(c),(e), and (g), and is also protected under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 section (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424, (b)(5), and (b)(6).

- Section 3.3(b)(1) protects information that could be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.
- Section 1.4(a) protects information that could be expected to reveal military plans, weapons systems, or operations.
- Section 1.4(c) protects information that could be expected to reveal intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology.
- Section 1.4(e) protects information that could be expected to reveal scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security.
- Section 1.4(g) protects information that could be expected to reveal vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security.
- FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424 protects organizational and personnel information for the DIA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) protects inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.
- FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) protects information which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of certain individuals.



OSD stands as the appellate authority and will coordinate any appeals regarding this case. A written appeal must be filed within 60 days explaining the rationale for reversal of the decision. Reference should be made to OSD MDR Case 14-M-3329. Letters of appeal should be sent to the following address:

WHS/ESD Records and Declassification Division
Attention: Luz Ortiz
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite 02F09-02
Alexandria, VA 22350-3100

If you have any questions, contact me by e-mail at Records.Declassification@whs.mil.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Luz D. Ortiz", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Luz D. Ortiz
Chief, Records and Declassification Division

Enclosures:

1. MDR request
2. Documents 1 and 2

OSD 1.4 (C)
JS 1.4(a),(g)

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#1

CIA
EO 13526
1.4(c)<25Yrs

FINAL REPORT

~~(S)~~ CJCS External Review of Guantanamo Bay Intelligence Operations (U)

~~(S)~~ I. BACKGROUND:

~~(S)~~ On 17 JUN 2002 Acting Commander, US Southern Command requested CJCS provide SOUTHCOM assistance with an external review of ongoing Guantanamo Bay [REDACTED] Under guidance provided by Director, Joint Staff, a team of subject matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca AZ, was tasked to perform the external review.

~~(S)~~ The external review team received the following mission statement:

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ In addition, CINCSOUTH also requested the team look at the following specific evaluation tasks:

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ The team conducted its external review during the period 14 August through 04 September 2002 with visits and interviews of all involved agencies. The team traveled to SOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, and the US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 21-28 August, 2002 [REDACTED]

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14-M-3329

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WIIS
Date: 15 Aug 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7); 10 U.S.C. 424
Reason: 1.4(c), (e), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5), (6) +
MDR: 14 -M- 3329

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DIA reviewed the document and determined some portions exempt from public release. Our review decision is subject to review results of other agencies. Recommend the Department of the Army review this information prior to public release. wcj//3 April 2014. DIA REDACTIONS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN YELLOW

JS 1.4(a),(g)+

OSD 1.4 (C)

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 1.4(c),(g)+

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5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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~~(S)~~ II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

~~(S)~~ If the United States is to truly conduct a Global War on Terrorism we must adopt a long-term view of that war

[REDACTED]

We should realize that our nation faces an entirely new threat framework and if we plan to win this struggle we must invest both human capital and infrastructure

The detainees at GTMO have [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] seen numerous successes and should be congratulated for their work

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ During its evaluations, the External Review Team discovered

[REDACTED]

no orchestrated public affairs or media strategy,

There is

no long term perspective of any kind. Other problems include a bifurcated command structure with multiple, parallel, non-supportive chains of command.

[REDACTED]

The

JS 1.4 (a), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)
OSD 1.4(c)

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

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entire mission is woefully undermanned and until a new [REDACTED] is approved, shortages will continue to negatively impact the mission. The current facilities at Guantanamo, to include detention, housing and [REDACTED] are totally inadequate for a mission of such national importance.

(S)

[REDACTED] Similarly, the lack of any US Government Public Policy or Public Diplomacy Strategy has damaged the operation. A constant stream of visitors, unfettered media access, and an almost total lack of Public Affairs guidance have all [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Shortsighted incremental development and focus has hindered mission success and the lack of long-term perspective is evident.

(S)

[REDACTED] the external evaluation team spent a great deal of effort examining the six specific mission tasks included in the SOUTHCOM request.


(S) 1.

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JS 1.4(a)(9)+ CIA 1.4(c)
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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
DIA 1.4(c)+
5 U.S.C. 552
(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424



In reality, all GTMO players report excellent cooperation.


OSD 5 U.S.C.
552 (b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

(S) **RECOMMENDATION:** Formalize the efforts of all players (DoD and no-DoD)




(S) 2.


(S) No formal coordination agreement currently exists between DOD and non-DOD agencies. Coordination is largely informal, tentative and primarily the result of individual efforts.



- Several facts serve to "bind" all participating agencies.
 - The detainees belong to DOD, therefore coordination



(S) **RECOMMENDATION:** Formalize the efforts of non-DOD players



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JS 1.4(a),(g) + DIA 3.3(b)(1) +
S U.S.C. 552(b)(5) S U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

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Such agreement and organization would codify responsibilities for a greater unity of effort.

(S) 3. [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) 4. The relationship between the GTMO JTF(s) and [REDACTED]

(S) There is currently no formal relationship between [REDACTED]. The Joint Task Forces are subordinate to SOUTHCOM and report through Commander US Southern Command to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense. [REDACTED] and reports directly to the Secretary of the Army who reports to the Secretary of Defense. [REDACTED]

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JS 1.4(a),(g)

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

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and no authoritative statement prioritizing or unifying the two missions has been issued by the Secretary of Defense.

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] is gathering evidence for Military Commissions. However, at present any such commission lacks an overall stated strategy within DOD with DOJ. This has had a negative impact on the overall

[REDACTED]

- The delay in the transfer/release assessments by law enforcement is directly related to law enforcement's inability to adequately assess the prosecutorial value of individuals.

• [REDACTED]

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JS 1.4(a),(g)

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);

10 U.S.C. 424

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[REDACTED]

(S) RECOMMENDATIONS: Develop and promulgate a DOD prosecutorial strategy, which speaks specifically to coordination with DOJ. An overall strategy regarding which cases will be removed to US Federal court would allow all prosecutors, both at DOD and DOJ, to focus on the cases they will handle in the forum for which they are responsible.

- Designate a lead prosecutor to implement the overall strategy, to facilitate prioritization of existing criminal cases, and to direct the transfer assessment by determining which cases have no prosecutorial value.

[REDACTED] Appointment of prosecutors could enable plea bargains, [REDACTED] (e.g. Walker-Lindh).

- Define the Military Commission concept of operations. Closely integrate a prosecutorial team with operations at GTMO.

(S) 5. Taskings in support of detainee legal defense issues.

(S) Civilian litigation requests impact [REDACTED] Short-fused, unvetted taskings in support of DOJ federal litigation are onerous and time consuming and create a significant drain on [REDACTED] manpower.

- During May 2002 and the months prior [REDACTED] received numerous short-fused requests for litigation support from DOJ to DOD. The requests were for such items as affidavits, witness interviews, and documents related to particular cases. These taskings were important in supporting ongoing federal litigation efforts.

- In May 2002, [REDACTED] received approximately a dozen such requests. One request alone required [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These short-fused requests require an enormous amount of time and coordination within [REDACTED] before a response can be provided.

- In recent months, the requests for litigation support appear to have reduced in number commensurate with litigation. With the

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JS 1.4(a),(g) OSD 1.4(c)

DIA 5 U.S.C.

552(b)(3)

10 U.S.C. 424

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prosecutorial efforts in their infancy, the need for litigation support will only expand. Only legitimate requests for support should be forwarded to [REDACTED]. Finally, the proper responding entity must be identified and it is not always [REDACTED].

(S) RECOMMENDATION: Use established military chain of command and communications for processing litigation support requests as a means of ensuring a thorough review of the requirements and to ensure the appropriate directorate is tasked with responding. DOD and DOJ or other relevant interagency element should do so via a Memorandum of Agreement

(S) 6. Determine if [REDACTED]

(S) The current [REDACTED]

(S) RECOMMENDATION: The new [REDACTED] specify [REDACTED] leadership and key/essential personnel should be assigned for two year accompanied tours. These "key" personnel (2 year PCS accompanied tours) should include JTF leadership, [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] should also include "essential" personnel (1 year PCS unaccompanied tours) for [REDACTED] and "temporary" (179 day TDY tours for junior support (J1, J4, J6) staff personnel. This assignment policy in concert with 100% [REDACTED] fill will [REDACTED].

Current Naval Base infrastructure will support two-year accompanied tours for [REDACTED]. Assignment policies should be consistent for all Services.

(S) III. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

(S) 1. POLICY

(S) A. [REDACTED]

(S) Observation: [REDACTED]

The "immediate" startup of Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) operations, short term funding focus, and use of "as is" facilities have proven detrimental to the long term GWOT mission.

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
JS 1.4(a), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 1.4(c) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3),
10 U.S.C. 424

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OSD 1.4 (C) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3),
10 U.S.C. 424

~~(S)~~ Recommendation:




~~(S)~~ B. Inadequate Detention Facilities

~~(S)~~ Observation:

reports from Congress have expressed serious concerns that the current detention facilities at GTMO degrade the

by failing to provide adequate security variation, incentives to encourage detainee cooperation, and sufficient capacity.

~~(S)~~ Discussion:



~~(S)~~ Operational flexibility is required for detainee management, e.g., changing units was built with adequate Rotations to this section provide obvious benefits.

Facilities flexibility enables the commander to

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JS 1.4(a), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3),
10 U.S.C. 424

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OSD 1.4 (C) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424

control [REDACTED]

(S) Recommendations: Direct SOUTHCOM to create a Master Facilities Plan. Such a plan should include the following requirements:

- Current military operations necessitate greater capacity overall; a medium security facility might be built for considerably less cost. Building a *medium security camp* would facilitate more communal living arrangements for [REDACTED] or those awaiting potential transfer or release. Building [REDACTED] would support [REDACTED] and assist the detainee operations commander in punishing those detainees who commit misconduct.

- An expanded capacity to allow for routine maintenance plan – units completed a few months ago are already rusted near the toilets & sinks. The exterior of all the general population facilities is also degraded. The overcrowding restricts the ability for easy maintenance.

(S) C. Transfer/Releases have not occurred despite an approved process

(S) Observation: [REDACTED] desire to begin transferring appropriate detainees immediately. Leaders unanimously agree that [REDACTED]

(S) Discussion: Leaders at GTMO desire transfer of appropriate persons immediately for several reasons:

- Onward movement of some detainees would [REDACTED]

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DIA
S U.S.C.
552(b)(3),
10 U.S.C. 424

[REDACTED] These are many other examples of how commanders could utilize the transfer/release of some detainees to [REDACTED]

- Transfers/releases from GTMO could return the camp to its operational capacity. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Leaders at GTMO also believe that the longer detainees remain at GTMO, the *greater the chance that they will become hardened jihadists*, thus increasing the risk posed by these individuals to the United States.

(S) Thus far, only two detainees have been transferred out from GTMO -

[REDACTED]

- The transfer process is designed to provide the decision-makers in Washington with two recommendations - [REDACTED] via SECARMY. Once these two recommendations arrive at [REDACTED] a decision can be made, per the approved policy. [REDACTED] has provided approximately 20 recommendations to [REDACTED] SECARMY has provided three. Hence, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] will not provide recommendations for transfer/release in the near future because they have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- There appears to be [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ **Recommendations:** Expedite Transfer/Release Processes:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This could hasten the simultaneous forwarding (or nearly simultaneous forwarding) of recommendations to OSD from both entities.

[REDACTED]

- Appropriate DOD officials should provide the law enforcement and risk assessment guidance [REDACTED] to facilitate investigations.

- Appropriate DOD officials should determine the appropriate standard of investigation [REDACTED] and provide guidance.

~~(S)~~ **D. Public Policy Plan**

~~(S)~~ **Observation:** Currently no USG Public Policy Strategy exists. OSD-PA, OJCS, SOUTHCOM-PA, and JTFs all operate independently with no overarching strategy. [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ **Recommendations:** OSD-PA lead effort in coordination with SOUTHCOM Staff [REDACTED] to construct "USG Public Diplomacy Strategy." [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ **2. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:**

~~(S)~~ **A.** [REDACTED]


~~(S)~~ **Observation:** [REDACTED]

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DIA S U.S.C. (552(b)(3)), 10 U.S.C. 4724

JS 1.4(a), (g) +
S U.S.C. (552(b)(5)

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
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JS 1.4(a), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 1.4(c), (e), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C.
424

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JS 1.4(a), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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DIA 1.4(c) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

~~(S)~~ B. PSYOPS/IO

~~(S)~~ Observation:

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ The environment at GTMO and the circumstances under which the detainees are being held

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Discussion:

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] has experienced limited success [REDACTED] at GTMO.

[REDACTED] have proven themselves to be ineffective in many cases.

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Recommendations:

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

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
DIA 1.4(c),(g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

(IA 1.4(c))

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JS 1.4(a),(g) +

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)




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DIA 1.4(c) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

JS 1.4 (a), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)
CIA 1.4(c)

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
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DIA 1.4(c) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424
+ (b)(5)



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JS1.4
(a), (g) +
5 U.S.C.
552(b)(5)

(S) [REDACTED]
now presents an opportunity to organize the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in a more efficient manner. The 20 August 2002 JCS
Execution Order provides for a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(S) Observation:
coordination

aided initial
[REDACTED]

(S) Discussion:

(S) [REDACTED]

JS 1.4(a), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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DIA 1.4(c), (g) +

OSD 1.4(c) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5) + 1.4(g)

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

~~(S)~~ Recommendation:

~~(S)~~ The concept of flexibility [redacted] is effective and should be continued. Likewise, accommodating transfer of primary interest to another element [redacted] as information on individual detainees is developed, is logical and should be continued. The future could allow for participation by organizations not already at GTMO i.e. Treasury, Customs, ATF, and [redacted] sets the precedent. [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Coordinating Venue. [redacted]

[redacted] Each equity depends to a lesser or greater degree on the other's cooperation because practically speaking the extremely high volume of work demands it and each other's information reports are of value to all in the JTF. [redacted]

[redacted] Because of the sophistication required in approach and personnel, the numerous legal and procedural issues, cultural familiarization required and skill sets needed by operations personnel across-the-federal board, this venue should be a course of instruction provided to operational and other key personnel prior to deployment [redacted] which is addressed elsewhere in this report.

[redacted] ~~(S)~~ Lastly, although the operations commentary centered on process, as stated elsewhere in this report, not until changes are made to the physical facility will application of proper interrogation techniques be

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JS 1.4(a),(g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)


DIA 1.4(c),(e),(g) +

OSD 1.4(c),(e),(g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

possible. A dormitory atmosphere pervades the general population lockup, which, no matter how austere looking and efficiently managed, provided a support structure to the detainees. This is because




(S)

Process improvement recommendations related to detainee interrogations are on balance incremental in nature and should be able to be accomplished with minimum disruption.

(S) E. INTELLIGENCE CONTINGENCY FUNDS (ICF)



(S) Discussion.



(S) F.

(S) Observation:

The facility in use is a former Naval Security Group building that is too small for

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OSD 1.4(c) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + 1.4(e), (g)

JS 1.4(a), (g)

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current and projected [redacted] and intelligence operations.

DIA 1.4
(c), (e), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552
(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

(S) **Recommendation:** Work with HPSCI/SSCI for an emergency intelligence appropriation to fund construction of [redacted] perhaps modeled on [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) In the interim, investigate the possibility of designating another large building on Naval Base Guantanamo [redacted] If a building exists, a small amount of construction money may drastically change this situation for the better.

(S) G. [redacted]

(S) **Observation:** Direct taskings from senior headquarters to [redacted] hindered [redacted] operations at Guantánamo Bay.

(S) **Discussion:**

[redacted]

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
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OSD 1.4 (c), (e), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

JS 1.4(a), (g)

DIA 1.4 (c), (e), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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~~(S)~~ Recommendation

~~(S)~~ Observation:

~~(S)~~ Recommendation: SOUTHCOM should delegate authority to [redacted] to accept or reject requirements tasking, [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Discussion:

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~

JS 14(a), (g)

(S) The [redacted] authorizes seven CM&D billets:

[redacted]

feels that

(S) [redacted] are required

(S) Three personnel

The increased connectivity now available at Guantanamo Bay should enable these three people to move forward.

(S) Recommendation [redacted]

(S) 3. TRAINING

(S) A. New Skill Sets:

(S) Observation: [redacted]

(S) Discussion:

(S) [redacted]


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JS 1.4(a),(g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 1.4(c),(g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), 10 U.S.C.
424

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(S) 1.4(c),
(g) + 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424



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(S) Recommendation: [redacted] establish a "Terrorism University"
to provide a common orientation curriculum for personnel assigned to

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the GTMO operation. "TU" training would target all personnel who contact detainees with specific training focus on their particular billet or function. This training should be received prior to their deployment in order to minimize the degradation and impact on the GTMO operation conducting remedial training. Interrogators and debriefers who have worked at [redacted] detention center should be sent to "TU" as advisors/instructors. (See Annex A "Curriculum")

~~(S)~~ B. Lessons Learned:

~~(S)~~ Observation: "Lessons Learned" are not being captured at Joint or Service Levels.

~~(S)~~ Recommendations:

[redacted]

4. ~~(S)~~ PERSONNEL

~~(S)~~ A. Tour Lengths

~~(S)~~ Observation: Personnel turbulence caused by the current [redacted] tour lengths severely impacts and hinders [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Discussion:

[redacted]

Tour lengths [redacted] should balance factors of continuity and flexibility based upon mission requirements. Key billets - leadership, [redacted] - need to be staffed for long-term continuity. NAVBASE GTMO has stated its ability to immediately [redacted] Essential personnel - [redacted] should [redacted]

The balance of personnel (other staff and support personnel) may be assigned on temporary duty tours so long as adequate provisions are

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DIA 1.4(c) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

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OSD 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + 1.4(c)

JS 1.4(a)(9)

made for on-site overlapping turnover time. All services should follow similar assignment guidance.

~~(S)~~ **Recommendations**

~~(S)~~ The new [redacted] specify [redacted] leadership and key/essential personnel be assigned for two year accompanied tours. These "key" (2 year PCS accompanied tours) should include JTF leadership, [redacted]. The [redacted] should also include "essential" (1 year PCS unaccompanied tours) for [redacted] and "temporary" (179 day TDY tours for junior support (J1, J4, J6) staff personnel. This assignment policy in concert with 100% [redacted] fill will [redacted]

Current Naval Base infrastructure will support two-year accompanied tours for [redacted]. Assignment policies on the [redacted] should be consistent for all Services.

~~(S)~~ The [redacted]

In the future, [redacted]

~~(S)~~ **B. Force Structure**

~~(S)~~ **Observation:** Service force structures will continue to encounter continued difficulty in [redacted] in accordance with the proposed [redacted]

~~(S)~~ **Discussion:** Service force structures still reflect "Cold War" threat scenarios and are not optimized to prosecute a Global War On Terrorism. All Services can depend on and should build upon a continual future expanding requirement for [redacted]

[redacted] The 1997 Army FORCES COMMAND decision to [redacted]

FORCES COMMAND currently estimates [redacted]


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JS 1.4(a),(g)


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DIA 1.4(e)+5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424



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~~(S)~~ Recommendations:



~~(S)~~ Observation:

(specifically, US Army personnel) with only SECRET level clearances were unable to severely hindering at Guantánamo Bay. Previously working at the tactical level have not required

~~(S)~~ Discussion:



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JS 1.4 (a), (g)

OSD 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(3);
16 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

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impossible if [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Furthermore, the [REDACTED]
analyst is distracted from his primary duties because he must spend
additional time [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In essence, the
analyst must [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ **Recommendations:**

~~(S)~~ Direct that [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ **Observation:** Inadequate numbers of [REDACTED] at
Guantánamo Bay hindered [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ **Discussion:**

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] runs a linguist pool to support [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The linguist pool does not support all the native languages
spoken by the detainee population [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ The War on Terror requires the US Government, the Department of
Defense, and the Services to reexamine the requirement for [REDACTED]

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JS 1.4(a), (g)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DIA S U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

OSD S U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

~~(S)~~ Recommendations:

~~(S)~~ Request the [redacted] lead an evaluation of future government, specifically [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Direct the [redacted] to expand its capacity to accommodate the requirements identified [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Direct the [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Direct the [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Examine the possibility of [redacted] to meet mission requirements at Guantanamo Bay.

~~(S)~~ Examine the exploitation of [redacted] to enhance existing and future [redacted] at Guantanamo Bay.

Prepared by [redacted] Chief, GTMO External Review

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